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1A laboratory stress-test of bid, double and offer auctions  
by 
Morten Søberg1
March 7th, 2002 
Abstract: 
This paper reports on the empirical properties of the bid auction (buyers propose prices), offer auction 
(sellers suggest prices) and double auction (both buyers and seller initiate price quotes). These trading 
institutions are stress-tested using a nonstationary monopolistic market environment in which the 
buyers' demand schedule and the single seller's supply curve shift unpredictably between trading 
periods. The principal result is threefold. First, double auction prices tend to be greater than offer 
auction prices which again tend to be greater than bid auction prices. Second, the listed ranking 
reflects tendencies only. The laboratory data do not support statistically significant behavioral 
differences between the three auctions. Third, trading is highly efficient regardless of auction type.  
Keywords: Sequential auctions, experimental economics.  
JEL classification: D44, C90. 
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21. Introduction 
A trading institution is a set of rules that govern economic transactions amongst market participants. 
Such rules specify the market participants' admissible messages (for instance, a message could be an 
offer to buy, an offer to sell or an acceptance of any such offer), regulate the dissemination of this 
information to the market and define how messages are converted into binding contracts (Friedman, 
1993). An institution is deemed sequential when traders negotiate prices continuously during real-time 
sequences.  
The bid, offer and double auctions are examples of sequential trading institutions (Davis and Holt, 
1993). A bid auction enables buyers only to submit bids to buy. Every bid is displayed to all market 
participants and a trade is executed if a seller chooses to accept a bid. Conversely, an offer auction 
allows only sellers to announce offers to sell. All offers are common knowledge. Trading occurs 
conditional upon an offer being accepted by a buyer. The double auction is a combination of these two 
one-sided auctions that lets both sellers and buyers suggest and accept offers. Each of the three 
sequential auction types provides public display of all confirmed contract prices.   
The behavioral properties of the double auction - reliable and rapid convergence to competitive 
equilibrium - are well documented in the experimental economics literature (see Holt, 1995 for a   
summary of these results). However, the total number of laboratory studies of the bid and offer 
auctions is comparatively small and these analyses appear to have yielded but tentative conclusions. 
Smith (1964) reported the original experimental evaluation of the (oral, non-computerized) bid, offer 
and double auction trading institutions. The subjects in Smith's experiments were one-way traders, that 
is, either buyers who could not resell or sellers who were not allowed to repurchase. Smith conjectured 
that confining the ability to generate price signals to just one side of the market might affect (the time 
path of) contract prices as follows: Offer auction rules could yield competition for trading 
opportunities amongst sellers and hence result in relatively low prices, whereas in the bid auction the 
competitive pressure would affect the buyers and thereby imply increasing offers to buy as well as 
relatively high prices. Using six laboratory sessions and a symmetric environment with an equal 
number of buyers and sellers, Smith found supportive evidence for his a priori hypothesis that (mean 
3and equilibrium) bid auction prices tend to be greater than double auction prices which again tend to 
be greater than offer auction prices2.
Walker and Williams (1988) examined the robustness of Smith's results. They conducted two sets of 
computerized experiments, twenty-one laboratory sessions in all. Each session employed an equal 
number of buyers and sellers. The first set consisted of four double auction control sessions plus nine 
sessions in which the subjects traded on all three auctions in different sequences, each of which lasted 
3-5 trading periods. The core result was an ordering of mean prices that differed from Smith's whereby 
double auction prices are greater than offer auction prices, which tend to be greater than bid auction 
prices. None of these differences were statistically discernible at conventional significance levels.   
The second set of experiments was comprised of nine sessions using similar demand and supply 
parameters as during the initial runs. However, there were no alterations of auction rules within any 
one session. Mean prices in the initial trading periods were ranked double auction > offer auction > bid 
auction, whereas time effects rendered prices during the last trading periods weakly consistent with 
Smith's results. Importantly, the observed market behavior varied across subject groups in a manner 
that was seemingly unrelated to differences in auction types. Walker and Williams concluded that 
Smith's original findings had not received sufficient support to be regarded as an experimentally 
generated stylized fact.  
The objective of the present study is to enlarge the body of experimental evidence on sequential one-
sided and double auctions. The reported experiment is not a reproduction of the outlined studies on 
bid-double-offer auctions, but differs from Smith's as well as Walker and Williams' studies with regard 
to laboratory environment and experimental design as follows.  
First, this study constitutes a stress-test in that bid-double-offer auction behavior is investigated within 
an "extreme" laboratory environment characterized by imperfect competition and markedly volatile 
market demand and supply (Smith, 1982 contains a methodological classification of economic 
experiments). Specifically, trading on the bid, double and offer auctions is observed within an 
asymmetric market environment characterized by a single seller and four buyers as well as by market 
                                                     
2 In these experiments each buyer (seller) could at most buy (sell) a single unit of a fictitious good in each trading period. 
Albeit not considering the double and offer auctions, Plott and Smith (1978) concluded that the (oral) bid auction tends to 
yield supra-competitive prices also when subjects have the capacity to trade multiple units per trading period.  
4demand and supply schedules that shift unpredictably between trading periods3. Hence, this study also 
extends Smith (1981) who compared the offer auction (just one laboratory session) and the double 
auction (three sessions) in a stationary monopolistic environment. It moreover relates to Jamison and 
Plott's (1997) original study of the effect of unpredictable demand and supply shifts on the 
performance of the double auction. 
Second, this experimental investigation utilizes a balanced ABA crossover design (Friedman and 
Sunder, 1994). This means that during each laboratory session a group of subjects participate in three 
trading sequences on two different auctions. In general, any session first implements auction rule A, 
then switches to auction rule B before reverting to auction rule A anew. Below trading during a total 
of six sessions are reported in the form of observations of prices, quantities, efficiency levels and 
division of trade gains between sellers and buyers that are treated econometrically as panel data. The 
ABA crossover design in conjunction with a linear econometric model for panel data facilitate an 
improved control for and quantitative evaluation of subject group and sequence effects. The purpose 
of this approach is to disentangle group and time effects from the impact of alterations in auction rules 
and thereby allow for a focused institutional comparison of the bid, double and offer auctions.   
Third, this study can be classified as exploratory experimentation as opposed to a theory-driven 
process (Steinle, 1997). Thus, the principal null hypotheses tested below assert no behavioral 
differences between the three auction types and the two-sided alternative hypotheses do not specify 
rankings of the auctions. This research strategy is based on the fact that economic theory does not 
yield concise predictions of the behavioral properties of the three auction types when each agent 
demands/supplies multiple units under inherently uncertain market information conditions (Klemperer, 
1999). At the same time this approach contrasts with Smith's initial analysis, which tested an 
(empirical) a priori hypothesis based upon pilot experiments as well as Walker and Williams' 
reexamination of Smith's proposition. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in five sections. Section 2 presents the experimental design. 
The variables, econometric model and hypotheses used to evaluate the laboratory data are described in 
Section 3. The two subsequent sections present the experimental results and contain a discussion of the 
findings respectively. The last section concludes and offers suggestions for further research. 
                                                     
3 Walker and Williams' first set of laboratory sessions also employed demand and supply shifts, but only between sequences 
that consisted of three and five trading periods, i.e., two shifts per session. Shifts are considered unpredictable if demand and 
supply schedules are shifted (up or down) by non-constant amounts between trading periods as opposed to studies of 
nonstationary environments in which demand and/or supply cycle (see, for instance, Davis et al., 1993). 
52. Experimental design and procedures 
In each laboratory session four buyers constituted the demand side of the market whereas a single 
seller represented the market's supply side. The market participants' trading roles were predetermined 
as either buyer or seller. Therefore speculation in the form of repurchase and resale was disallowed.  
Endowing the four buyers with individual unit valuations for multiple units of a fictitious homogenous 
good induced market demand. A transaction gave a buyer a profit in experimental dollars equal to the 
value of the difference between the induced value of the traded unit and the agreed price. Alternately, 
assigning the seller unit costs over a range of units induced market supply. The seller's profit from any 
transaction equaled the difference between price and induced cost of the traded unit.  
Figure 1 depicts the basic configuration of the induced aggregate demand, supply and the marginal 
revenue schedule derived from the market demand. Table I contains the individual cost and valuation 
arrays for the seller and the buyers respectively. All costs and values are denoted in experimental 
dollars. 
Figure 1. Aggregate demand, supply and marginal revenue schedules 
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6Table I. Individual demand and supply schedules 
UnitTrading role 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Buyer 1 48 - - - - - - 34 32 - - - - - - 16 
Buyer 2 - 46 - - - - 36 - - 30 - - - - 18 - 
Buyer 3 - - 44 - - 38 - - - - 28 - - 20 - - 
Buyer 4 - - - 42 40 - - - - - - 26 22 - - - 
Seller 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 26 28 30 - 
In the competitive theoretic equilibrium 12 units are traded at the market clearing price level of 24 
experimental dollars4. The equilibrium quantity is evenly split between the buyers who purchase 3 
units each. Equivalently, all market participants have both intra-marginal and extra-marginal units. In 
equilibrium trade gains are completely exhausted, whence trading efficiency equals 100%. The 
induced demand and supply schedules are symmetric. Thus, in equilibrium the aggregate trade gains 
of 312 experimental dollars are equally divided between the seller and the buyer side of the market. 
There are two relevant theoretical market power benchmarks in this experiment: The efficient first-
order discrimination outcome and the inefficient single-price monopoly solution. In lieu of the chosen 
demand and supply parameters first-degree price discrimination would imply prices in the range [48, 
26]. The efficient trade gains - 312 experimental dollars - are accrued by the seller.   
The price-quantity pair [32, 9] gives the single-price standard monopoly prediction. Hence, the 
monopoly price mark-up has been specified as 8 experimental dollars. The monopoly profit is 216 
experimental dollars, or 75% of the potential aggregate trade gains implied by the standard monopoly 
outcome. The quantity distortion is 3 units, 25% of the competitive equilibrium volume. This outcome 
yields an efficiency of 92%. A summary of the theoretical benchmarks is given in Table II.  
Table II. Benchmarks 
 Price‡ Trading volume Efficiency Seller's relative trade gains 
Competitive equilibrium 24 12 100% 50% 
First-degree price discrimination [48, 26] 12 100% 100% 
Single-price monopoly outcome 32 9 92% 75% 
‡ Denoted in experimental dollars.
7Six laboratory sessions were conducted, each of which consisted of 15 separate trading periods. 
Alternatively, no intertemporal carry-over between periods was allowed. Non-constant vertical shifts 
in the aggregate demand and supply were accomplished between all trading periods in each 
experimental session. The magnitude and direction of these shifts are relative to the basic 
configuration in Table I. Thus, the relative location of the buyers on the demand arrays did not change. 
Neither the magnitude nor the direction of the shifting demand and supply schedules were common 
knowledge, although each buyer (seller) was informed that his own demand (supply) schedule would 
shift between trading periods. A description of the shifts, by trading period, is given in Table III.  
Table III. Constants added to the entries in Table I, by trading period 
Trading period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Amount added 0 6 24 15 36 33 18 9 30 39 42 27 45 12 21 
These vertical shifts implied a variation in the competitive price level between 24 and 69 experimental 
dollars. The residual benchmarks (the single-price monopolistic mark-up, the feasible first-degree 
price discrimination range relative to the competitive price level, trading volume, efficiency and the 
seller's relative trade gains) as depicted in Table II were invariant with respect to the demand and 
supply shifts and remained constant across the 15 trading periods in each laboratory session.  
The bid, double and offer auctions were tested within the described laboratory environment on 
computerized networks using experimental software downloaded from the University of Arizona, 
Tucson5. The double auction rules allowed buyers (sellers) to post bids (asks) at any time during a 
trading period6. A bid (an ask) consisted of a price-quantity pair. An improvement rule required that 
new bids (asks) from any buyer (the seller) needed to specify higher (lower) prices in order to replace 
a former bid (ask) of his. This requirement was lexicographic in terms of affecting only the price and 
not the quantity element of a bid/an ask.  
The highest bid and lowest ask as well as queues of inferior asks and bids were shown on all traders' 
computer screens. The seller (a buyer) might accept the best bid (ask) at all times before the end of the 
trading period. If the specified quantity was greater than one unit, sellers (buyers) had the option of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
4 The midpoint in the equilibrium price tunnel [22, 26] has been deemed the competitive price prediction. 
5 The applied software package is called ESLDA 1.43 and is accessible at http://www.econlab.arizona.edu. 
8accepting parts of a market bid (ask). In the event of a trader proposing or accepting a bid (ask) 
implying a negative profit, he was warned by the program and given an opportunity to alter his 
message. There was a continuously updated listing of contracts (stating agreed price and quantity) on 
all computer screens as well as a clock showing seconds remaining of each trading period. Each buyer 
(seller) could also see his demand (supply) schedule and profits derived from transactions during the 
prevailing trading period.  
The computerized one-sided auctions were similar to the described double auction procedures except 
that the bid (offer) auction allowed buyers (the seller) only to announce bids (asks).  
The experimental design is outlined in Table IV. The employed triple ABA crossover design implies 
that subjects participated in three sequences of trading each of which consisted of five trading periods.  
Table IV. Experimental design 
Session‡‡ Trading period 
 3 + 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
040400a Practice Offer auction  Double auction Offer auction  
040400b Practice Double auction Offer auction Double auction 
040400c Practice Bid auction Double auction Bid auction 
050400d Practice Double auction Bid auction Double auction 
050400e Practice Bid auction Offer auction Bid auction 
050400f Practice Offer auction Bid auction Offer auction 
‡‡ Sessions 040400c and 050400f were briefly interrupted due to software failure at the start of trading period 3 and 8 
respectively.
Each experimental session ran as follows. Upon arriving in the laboratory subjects were randomly 
assigned a trader role as either a buyer or a seller. Subjects retained their trader role throughout the 
session. Then they were given the written instructions to read7. Afterwards they completed a self-
paced interactive introduction to the utilized computer software and an unpaid training session lasting 
six trading periods. These practice sessions commenced with trading on the relevant one-sided auction 
and ended with three trading periods using double auction rules. The training session also 
implemented shifts in demand and supply schedules between trading periods. No data from this part of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
6 Asks and bids were required to be non-negative and strictly lower than 100 experimental dollars: The software generated 
error messages that were displayed on the computer screen if an experimental subject violated any of these constraints. 
7 Appendix A contains the experimental instructions. 
9the experiment were recorded. Lastly, subjects traded for fifteen periods and finally were paid their 
tax-free aggregate earnings in private at the conclusion of the session. The length of a trading period 
was three minutes and each laboratory session lasted approximately two hours.   
The experimental subjects were 2nd - 5th year economics students at the University of Oslo. None of 
the participants had any previous experience with laboratory experiments. All subjects volunteered to 
participate following classroom announcements. The buyers received an average payoff of 24 US$, 
with max and min values equal to 35 US$ and 14 US$. The mean payoff earned by sellers equaled 36 
US$ (max = 45 US$, min = 24 US$)8.
3. Empirical modelling framework  
Four empirical performance measures are used to organize the laboratory data: Mean error deviation in 
contract price from the competitive level, aggregate trading volume, efficiency and the seller's relative 
proportion of realized trade gains.  
The adopted unit of observation is a single trading period and is constant across the different 
performance measures. Any observation of each performance measure is indexed relative to session i  
(i{1,2, .. , 6}) and trading period t (t{1,2, .. , 15}).  
The following one way fixed effects panel data model will be used as a 'workhorse' to describe and 
analyze the variation in each of the outlined performance measures (Greene, 1997): 
    tiShifttiOtiOSDtiDSBtiBSOtiOBtiBStiSStiSiti XDDDDDDDY ,,,,,,,3,32,2,1 HEEEEEEED  
First consider the left hand side of the equation. Since the model is applied to all performance 
measures, the dependent variable subsumes the following four variables: 
                                                     
8 The subjects' aggregate profits denoted in experimental dollars were converted to and paid in Norwegian kroner (NOK). 
The employed conversion rate between experimental dollars and NOK was 0.3 (0.1) for buyers (sellers). The listed values in 
U.S. dollars are based on the US$/NOK exchange rate that prevailed at the time of the experiment (April 4th and 5th, 2000). 
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In the definition of mean error deviation in contract price from the competitive level Q denotes the 
total number of contracts in trading period (i,t); Pq is the q-th contract price and PCE the relevant 
competitive equilibrium prediction. Trading volume (V) equals the aggregate number of units 
specified in contracts confirmed within any one trading period with the number of units shifted in the 
q-th contract given by vq. In the concept for efficiency E the expression 3j measures the realized 
profits of trader (buyer or seller) j whereas 3j(CE) denotes the competitive equilibrium level of profit 
for trader j. The seller's relative trade gains (TG) are defined as the ratio between the seller's profit 
(3Seller) and the aggregate profits accrued by all five market participants in trading period (i,t).  
Next consider the right hand side of the equation. The session specific constant terms are denoted Įi.
The exogenous regressors DS2 and DS3 are binary variables that assumes the value 1 during the second 
sequence (trading periods [6, 7, .. , 10]) and the third sequence (trading periods [11, 12, .. ,15]) of each 
laboratory session. DB is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when bid auction rules are 
implemented. Similarly, the binary variables DD and DO equal 1 whenever trading is governed by 
double auction and offer auction rules respectively. The variable XShift measures the numerical change 
in supply and demand schedules relative to the preceding trading period over the course of each 
laboratory session9. Lastly, İ(i,t) is a classical disturbance term with E[İ(i,t)]=0 and Var[İ(i,t)]=ı2(İ),
ӁiӁt.
                                                     
9 This variable has been constructed on the basis of the constants added to demand and supply between trading periods that 
were listed in Table III. Thus, the mean value (standard deviation) is 1.40 (15.62) whereas the max (min) value of XShift is 21 
(-33) experimental dollars. 
11 
The specification of individual constant terms mean that differences between the experimental 
sessions (subject groups) are viewed as parametric shifts of the regression function. The coefficients 
ES2 and ES3 measure the (time) effect of sequences two and three relative to the first sequence of 
trading in the ABA crossover design.  
In addition the model allows for two separate kinds of institutional effects. First, EB and EO measure 
the effect of auction rules on the level of the performance measure in question. Second, the estimates 
of the residual coefficients ES-B, ES-D and ES-O quantify the auction specific effect of the shifting 
demand and supply schedules.  
The subsequent section contains results on the estimated model in equation (1) using the different 
performance measures as dependent variables10. In addition the four parameter restrictions listed in 
Table V are tested in order to investigate the impact of subject, sequence and institutional effects on 
the mean of each performance measure. In each case the alternative hypothesis is the negation of the 
null hypothesis. 
Table V. Empirical null hypotheses  
Analytical formulation: Interpretation of null hypothesis:  
Į1 = Į2 = Į3 = Į4 = Į5 = Į6 No session effects 
ES2 = ES3 = 0 No sequence effects 
EB = EO = 0 No institutional differences in terms of level 
ES-B = ES-D = ES-O No institutional differences in terms of adjustment to shifts 
4. Experimental results 
4.1. Mean price deviations 
Pooling across all ninety trading periods from the six laboratory sessions, the median deviation of 
mean prices from the competitive level is 2.195 experimental dollars. The median price error in the 
bid, double, and offer auction is 1.365, 2.855 and 2.155 experimental dollars, respectively. Since the 
experimental design induced an equilibrium price range of four experimental dollars, a deviation from 
the competitive level within r 2 experimental dollars is consistent with the competitive equilibrium 
benchmark. For comparison the mean price deviations predicted by single-price monopoly and perfect 
price discrimination are 8 and 13 experimental dollars. The box-and-whisker plot in Figure 2 shows 
                                                     
10 Appendix B contains the complete set of observations used in the regression exercises. 
12 
the distribution of mean price deviations from equilibrium price levels from all trading periods 
stratified according to auction type.   
Figure 2. (Mean price - competitive price) deviations, by auction type 
Bid auction Double auction Offer auction
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The rectangular part of the plot extends from the lower quartile to the upper quartile, covering the 
center half of the sample. The centerline within the box shows the location of the sample median. The 
plus sign indicates the location of the sample mean, whereas the whiskers extend from the minimum 
and maximum values in the sample except for outside points. These are points that lie more than 1.5 
times the interquartile range below the box and are shown as small squares. Each of the three auction 
samples contains 30 observations. 
Table VI contains regression estimates for the model in equation (1) above, using mean error deviation 
in contract price from the competitive level as the dependent variable. The upper part of the table 
depicts the estimated session specific constant terms, which vary in the interval [-2.059, 7.074] 
experimental dollars. At the bottom of the table the results from the restriction tests show the overall 
session effect to be highly statistically significant. The listed R2 values further indicate that the session 
effects outweigh the residual effects in numerical terms. 
The estimated sequence effects in the form of coefficients bS2 and bS3 show that mean prices deviate 
weakly less (more) from the competitive level during trading periods 6-10 (11-15). However, it is 
evident that the null hypotheses of no such time effects cannot be rejected (p-value=0.6411). 
13 
Table VI. Estimated parameters for the model 
  tiShifttiOtiOSDtiDSBtiBSOtiOBtiBStiSStiSiti XDDDDDDDMD ,,,,,,,3,32,2, HEEEEEEED  
1. Session effects
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
Estimated coefficient -2.059 4.619 3.574 2.421 2.450 7.074 
2. Sequence effects 
 bS2 bS3
Estimated coefficient -0.3925 0.2878 
P-value 0.5932 0.7030 
3. Auction type effects 
 bB bO bS-B bS-D bS-O
Estimated coefficient -1.6872 -1.1032 -0.0869 -0.0675 -0.0068 
P-value 0.0595 0.2151 0.0130 0.0520 0.8410 
Number of observations:    90 Estimated autocorrelation of e:  0.21 
Mean value of MD (experimental dollars): 2.01 Standard deviation of MD:  3.92 
R2      0.57 R2 (session effects only):  0.47 
4. Tests of restrictions 
 Session effects Sequence effects Auction (level) Auction (adjustment)
Null hypothesis Į1=Į2=Į3=Į4=Į5=Į6 ES2 = ES3 = 0 EB = EO = 0 EB-S = ED-S = EO-S
P-value 0.0000 0.6411 0.1591 0.2226 
The estimated auction type effects reveal that mean price deviations from the competitive level are 
smaller under the one-sided auctions relative to the double auction. The point estimate of the bid 
(offer) auction relative to the double auction is -1.68 (-1.10) experimental dollars. However, these 
effects are not jointly statistically significant, albeit weakly so in the bid auction case (p=0.0595)11.
The estimated values of coefficients bS-B and bS-D are both negative and individually significantly 
different from zero. Thus, the shifts in the demand/supply schedules induce a weak hysteresis effect in 
that bid and double auction mean prices do not completely adjust to the new equilibrium. However, 
the value of bS-O cannot be ascertained to differ from zero, meaning that offer auction mean prices are 
not markedly affected by shifting demand and supply. At the same time the restriction of equal 
                                                     
11 The listed probability values are the values for two-tailed tests of the hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero. 
14 
adjustment factors across auction types cannot be discarded at conventional levels of significance 
(p=0.2226).  
Result 1:
The average deviation of mean prices from competitive levels is positive, but not to the extent 
predicted by either market power benchmark. Controlling for session, sequence and uncertain 
demand/supply effects, the regression results suggest the following ranking of mean prices: Double 
auction prices > offer auction prices > bid auction prices. Therefore prices in the one-sided auctions 
are comparatively closer to the competitive level than double auction price levels. The data do not 
support statistically significant institutional differences between the bid, double and offer auctions. 
4.2. Trading volume 
The single-price monopoly benchmark predicts a trading volume equal to 9 and hence a quantity 
restriction of 3 units below the competitive level of 12 units per trading period. The pooled median 
trading volume was 12. As depicted in Table VII, the median trading volume was the efficient 12 
during offer auction trading and 11.5 units when bid and offer auction rules applied.   
Table VII. Summary statistics of trading volume, by auction type 
 Bid auction Double auction Offer auction 
Mean 11.47 11.6 11.93 
Median 11.5 11.5 12 
Mode 12 11 12 
Standard deviation 0.57 0.67 0.94 
Maximum 12 13 13 
Minimum 10 11 8 
No. observations 30 30 30 
The regression estimates listed in Table VIII facilitate a more detailed analysis of the variability in 
trading volumes. The estimated session-specific constant terms display a variation of more than one 
unit with the estimate of D1 in fact exceeding the equilibrium level. The outcome of the restriction tests 
indicates that the null hypothesis of no session effects can be rejected. 
Sequence effects are operative in a statistically significant manner (p=0.0261). The estimated 
coefficients bS2 and bS3 are both negative, meaning that, ceteris paribus, average trading volume 
decline during laboratory sessions. Nevertheless, the limited economic magnitudes of these effects do 
15 
not suggest evidence of quantity withholding to the extent implied by the single-price monopoly 
prediction. 
Table VIII. Estimated parameters for the model 
  tiShifttiOtiOSDtiDSBtiBSOtiOBtiBStiSStiSiti XDDDDDDDV ,,,,,,,3,32,2, HEEEEEEED  
1. Session effects
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
Estimated coefficient 12.64 11.62 11.90 11.55 11.57 11.71 
2. Sequence effects 
 bS2 bS3
Estimated coefficient -0.4651 -0.2429 
P-value 0.0070 0.1637 
3. Auction type effects 
 bB bO bS-B bS-D bS-O
Estimated coefficient 0.0040 0.1793 -0.0026 0.0145 0.0039 
P-value 0.9843 0.3794 0.7342 0.0682 0.6128 
Number of observations:    90 Estimated autocorrelation of e:  0.045 
Mean value of V (units):   11.67 Standard deviation of V:  0.76 
R2      0.39 R2 (session effects only):  0.28 
4. Tests of restrictions 
 Session effects Sequence effects Auction (level) Auction (adjustment)
Null hypothesis Į1=Į2=Į3=Į4=Į5=Į6 ES2 = ES3 = 0 EB = EO = 0 EB-S = ED-S = EO-S
P-value 0.0000 0.0261 0.6029 0.2906 
The estimated auction type effects that relate to trading volume levels (bB and bO) are economically 
minuscule and statistically insignificant. The residual estimates and restriction test of coefficients bS-B,
bS-D and bS-O reveal that demand and supply shifts neither affect observed trading volumes nor differ in 
this regard across auction types. 
Result 2:
Mean bid, double and offer auction trading volumes do not generally deviate from the competitive 
equilibrium benchmark in an economically important way. Simultaneously, trading volumes differ in a 
statistically significant manner both across and within laboratory sessions but are invariant with 
respect to changes in auction types.  
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4.3. Efficiency 
The pooled median efficiency level is 98.72%. This corresponds to the double auction's median 
efficiency level, whereas the bid and offer auctions' median efficiencies are 99.36 and 100 percent. For 
comparison the single-price monopoly benchmark is 92%. 
Figure 3 provides horizontal box-and-whisker plots of efficiencies observed during bid, double and 
offer auction trading. Again the centerline within the box depicts the sample median whereas the plus 
sign corresponds to the sample mean. Far outside points are points that lie more than 3 times the 
interquartile range below the box and are shown as small squares with plus signs through them. In the 
case of the two single-sided auctions, there are 2 outside points and 2 far outside points. 
Figure 3. Efficiency levels, by auction type  
85.0 88.0 91.0 94.0 97.0 100.0
Bid auction
Double auction
Offer auction
The estimated regression coefficients and the hypothesis tests that are listed in Table IX reveal no 
statistically discernible session effects. The estimated sequence effects are weakly negative, albeit 
likewise statistically insignificant.  
The estimated auction type effects that relate to efficiency levels - bB and bO - are similarly small in 
value and neither individually nor jointly significant.  
Lastly, the estimated values of bS-B, bS-D and bS-O indicate that efficiencies are practically unaffected by 
the unpredictable demand and supply shifts. 
17 
Table IX. Estimated parameters for the model 
  tiShifttiOtiOSDtiDSBtiBSOtiOBtiBStiSStiSiti XDDDDDDDE ,,,,,,,3,32,2, HEEEEEEED  
1. Session effects
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
Estimated coefficient 99.16 99.24 99.61 98.54 98.68 99.59 
2. Sequence effects 
 bS2 bS3
Estimated coefficient -0.5944 -0.1278 
P-value 0.2436 0.8065 
3. Auction type effects 
 bB bO bS-B bS-D bS-O
Estimated coefficient 0.1183 -0.1639 -0.0014 -0.0097 -0.0067 
P-value 0.8468 0.7889 0.9518 0.6813 0.7772 
Number of observations:    90 Estimated autocorrelation of e:  0.069 
Mean value of E (percent):   98.87 Standard deviation of E:  1.85 
R2      0.07 R2 (session effects only):  0.046 
4. Tests of restrictions 
 Session effects Sequence effects Auction (level) Auction (adjustment)
Null hypothesis Į1=Į2=Į3=Į4=Į5=Į6 ES2 = ES3 = 0 EB = EO = 0 EB-S = ED-S = EO-S
P-value 0.5379 0.4604 0.8979 0.9679 
Result 3:
Trading on the bid, double and offer auction is efficient and yields an approximately complete 
exhaustion of the potential trade gains. The data reveal that the high efficiency levels are independent 
of session and sequence effects as well invariant with regard to changes in auction rules.  
4.4. Seller's relative trade gains 
Pooling across the laboratory sessions, the median value of the seller's relative trade gains is 57.53 
percent. The median relative trade gains accrued by a seller during double auction trading is 60.36%. 
The corresponding values for the bid and offer auctions are 55.29% and 56.41%. Single-price 
monopoly and perfect price discrimination would have implied the seller accruing 75% and 100% of 
the available trade gains. 
The empirical distributions of the seller's trade gains are depicted by auction type in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Seller's relative trade gains, by auction type 
Bid auction Double auction Offer auction
0.0
25.0
50.0
75.0
100.0
Table X reports the result of a regression analysis using seller's relative trade gains as the dependent 
variable.  
Consider first the session effects. Across the six sessions estimated session-specific constant terms 
vary between 38.65% and 76.24%. However, in five sessions these terms are greater than 58%.  
The hypothesis test reported at the bottom of the table indicate that the null hypothesis of no session 
effect of the mean of seller's relative trade gains can easily be rejected.  
The estimated sequence effects depict two contrasting marginal effects. Ceteris paribus, the seller's 
proportion of realized trade gains decreases during trading periods 6-10, relative to the initial five 
trading periods. During the last five trading periods of a laboratory session this proportion increases 
and cancels out the former effect. Nevertheless, the restriction tests reveal these joint effects to be 
statistically insignificant (p=0.6791). 
The point estimates of the auction effects in terms of level show that relative to double auction rules, 
sellers obtain smaller relative trade gains during bid and offer auction trading; -6.32 and -4.06 
percentage points respectively. This effect is weakly statistically significant in the bid auction case 
(p=0.063), albeit the null hypothesis of no differences between the three auction types cannot be 
rejected (p= 0.1686). 
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Table X. Estimated parameters for the model 
  tiShifttiOtiOSDtiDSBtiBSOtiOBtiBStiSStiSiti XDDDDDDDTG ,,,,,,,3,32,2, HEEEEEEED  
1. Session effects
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
Estimated coefficient 38.55 65.49 63.16 58.77 59.11 76.15 
2. Sequence effects 
 bS2 bS3
Estimated coefficient -1.0823 1.3438 
P-value 0.6980 0.6394 
3. Auction type effects 
 bB bO bS-B bS-D bS-O
Estimated coefficient -6.3179 -4.0607 -0.3175 -0.2874 -0.0753 
P-value 0.063 0.2295 0.0168 0.0299 0.5641 
Number of observations:    90 Estimated autocorrelation of e:  0.19 
Mean value of TG (percent):   56.51 Standard deviation of TG:  15.45 
R2      0.59 R2 (session effects only):  0.51 
4. Tests of restrictions 
 Session effects Sequence effects Auction (level) Auction (adjustment)
Null hypothesis Į1=Į2=Į3=Į4=Į5=Į6 ES2 = ES3 = 0 EB = EO = 0 EB-S = ED-S = EO-S
P-value 0.0000 0.6791 0.1686 0.3507 
The marginal effect of shifting demand/supply schedules is significantly different from zero during bid 
and double auction trading. In these cases a positive shift in demand/supply curves of 1 experimental 
dollar induces an approximately 0.3% decline in the seller's relative trade gains. No such effect is 
discernible in the case of the offer auction.  
Result 4:
On average the seller accrues 56 percent of generated trade gains, but this proportion varies 
extensively across sessions/subject groups. Controlling for session, sequence and uncertainty effects, 
the data imply the following ordering of the seller's relative trade gains: Double auction > offer auction 
> bid auction. Hence, the division of trade gains is comparatively more equitable under one-sided 
auction rules. These institutional differences are not statistically significant.    
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5. Discussion 
The bid, double and offer auctions are similar in that trading is sequential and all trading contracts are 
displayed to the entire market. Simultaneously, the institutional variation between the sequential 
auctions implies a potential variation in transaction costs, that is, the cost or difficulty of searching for 
market information, identifying trading partners and agreeing upon terms of trade (see, e.g., Joyce 
1983). Since messages from both sides of the market are permitted, the double auction may exhibit 
less transaction costs than either one-sided auction alternative. Nonetheless, the core result originating 
from this study is that the laboratory data do not support statistically significant bid-double-offer 
auction behavioral differences. Thus, market behavior is invariant with regard to whether and to which 
side of the market the ability to generate price quotes is restricted. 
However, there is a weakly statistically significant difference between the bid and double auction in 
that the former generates lower mean prices and smaller relative trade gains accrued by the seller than 
the latter auction. Hence, in a single seller case, the reported experiment indicates that buyers benefit 
from trading rules that prohibit the seller from actively initiating price quotes. Smith (1964) 
conjectured that competitive pressures amongst buyers would imply comparatively high bids and 
prices. The body of evidence presented in this paper suggests that buyers trading on a bid auction may 
succeed in tacit collusion against a seller to a degree that in fact dominates competitive pressure 
effects. Conversely, a single seller appears to gain from trading rules that facilitate maximum 
information flows - bids to buy and offers to sell - amongst the traders. Taken together, these 
observations suggest that the buyers' ability to tacitly collude is hampered when the seller engages in 
price negotiations by means of explicit signals to the market.  
Disregarding the lack of statistical significance, the reported analysis of mean prices suggest that 
double auction prices tend to be greater than offer auction prices which tend to be greater than bid 
auction prices. This rank ordering is consistent with the result obtained by Walker and Williams in 
their initial set of experiments. It also corresponds to price behavior in the initial trading rounds of 
their second set of experiments. In all of their experiments the number of buyers and seller was 
identical and shifts in demand and supply schedules coincided with shifts in auction rules. This 
laboratory investigation reproduces their ordering of sequential auction prices within an asymmetric 
market environment characterized by markedly stronger uncertainty.     
Another finding is that the observed data are more closely aligned to the competitive theoretical 
equilibrium than to any of the two imperfect competition benchmarks. The seller extracts on average 
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56% of the generated trade gains, compared to the imperfect competition range of [75%, 100%]. Mean 
prices deviate positively from the competitive price range, but not to the extent predicted by the 
single-price monopoly solution or perfect price discrimination. Also, observed trading efficiencies 
approximate 100%. Equivalently, monopoly power is not exercised in the form of quantity 
withholding. Specifically, the bid and offer auctions both generate lower mean prices and a more 
equitable distribution of trade gains than trading under double auction rules. This is consistent with 
previous monopoly experiments reported in Smith (1981) who concluded that the offer auction 
outperformed the double auction in terms of yielding comparatively lower prices as well as higher 
efficiency. The present study extends Smith's result by showing that the bid auction compares 
favorably with the double and offer auctions in terms of restricting monopoly power. Nevertheless, an 
unexplored issue is whether the revealed ability to bargain effectively against a single seller during bid 
auction trading will extend to laboratory environments characterized by larger groups of actively 
involved buyers.  
The reported data analysis discloses statistically significant subject group or session effects and 
indicates that these exert a stronger influence on the considered performance measures than alterations 
of institutional auction rules. Walker and Williams record similar findings whereas Smith (1964) was 
unable to detect significant interaction between a subject group variable and the trading institution 
variable. In this experiment subject group effects were considerably poignant in terms of division of 
trade gains. Across sessions or subject groups mean relative seller's trade gains varied between 39% 
and 76%. The immediate interpretation is that subjects' bargaining strengths as well as bargaining 
successes generally differ and emerge in a particularly transparent manner in asymmetric market 
environments: The degree to which a single seller is "weak" or "strong" importantly shapes and affects 
the trading process (also see Ledyard et al., 1994). Such effects may decrease with the number of 
conducted laboratory sessions. However, a related topic is whether the behavior of a monopolist 
depends upon the manner in which this role is (perceived to be) assigned. Winning the right to be a 
monopolist through a fair competitive process, or purchasing it at an auction, might induce a relatively 
increased aggressive behavior vis-à-vis buyers compared with the performance of single sellers 
following an explicitly random assignment of trader roles.   
Finally, this study provides evidence that reconfirm sequential trading institutions as being highly 
efficient. The median efficiency level in the offer auction case - when just one of five trader may 
initiate trading contracts - is 100%. Thus, confining the ability to suggest terms of trade to a (single) 
seller is a sufficient to yield efficient sequential trading processes. Pooling across the three auction 
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types, the median efficiency level 98.72%. This is consistent with Walker and Williams' experiments 
in which they observed a median efficiency level of 99.08%. Also, the potential trade gains are 
exploited despite uncertainty in the form of shifting demand and supply schedules. Jamison and Plott 
(1997) report similar efficiency results (mean = 97.2%; median = 100%) for double auction trading 
under unpredictable demand and supply conditions. The experimental results reported above indicate 
that the one-sided bid and offer auctions exhibit similar efficiency characteristics under uncertainty, 
even within an asymmetric market environment. 
6. Conclusion 
The bid, double and offer auctions constitute sequential trading institutions that differ with regard to 
the market participants' message spaces. The bid and offer auctions are one-sided and restricts the 
possibility to generate price quotes to the buyer and seller side respectively. The double auction 
combines the one-sided auctions and permits all market participants to suggest and confirm prices.  
The reported study has investigated the extent to which these institutional differences transform into 
behavioral dissimilarities in a monopolized laboratory environment characterized by nonstationary 
demand and supply schedules. The key result is negative in as much as the laboratory data fail to 
support statistically significant bid-double-offer auction behavioral variations. However, the results 
reveal economic differences in that mean prices and seller's relative trade gains are lower in the one-
sided auctions compared with the double auction.  
In this experiment the considered sequential auctions were exogenously superimposed upon simplified 
computerized markets in order to facilitate a clean institutional comparison. One extension of the 
reported research could be to investigate institutional competition amongst the bid, double and offer 
auctions. This issue could be analyzed as a game in which traders participate in referenda in which 
they cast votes for their preferred institutional alternative(s) and subsequently trade on the collectively 
chosen trading institution. An alternative approach is to study a coordination game in which the three 
auctions compete across consecutive rounds in terms of attracting the population of traders and 
thereby emerge as a convention. These avenues are left for further research. 
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Appendix A: Experimental instructions
A.1. General 
You are about to participate in an experiment where you will have an opportunity to earn money. The 
experiment is estimated to last approximately 2 hours. The money that you earn is tax-free and will be 
paid to you in cash immediately after the conclusion of the experiment. The size of the payment 
depends upon the decisions you make during the experiment.  
Professor Wilhelm Keilhau's Memorial Fund has provided funding for this experiment.  
The plan for the experiment is as follows: 
1. First, read these instructions carefully. If you have any queries, please be so kind as to raise your 
hand and the experimenter will assist you. You are not allowed to speak to any of the other 
participants during this experiment.
2. When everyone has finished reading, you will take part in 2 test runs and practice your role as a 
market participant. These tests include an interactive introduction to the computer program that is 
used to conduct the experiment. No profits are earned during these test runs.  
3. After the 2 test runs you will participate in 3 experimental markets. Your final payment equals the 
sum of your profits in these 3 markets. 
Specific instructions for sellers:
A.2. Your trading role 
In this experiment you are going to be a seller of a fictitious good on a computerized market.  
Apart from you there are 4 buyers on this market. 
Your supply curve for this good is shown numerically on your computer screen.  
Example 
A discrete supply curve for 4 units of the good may look like this (but will assume different values 
during the experiment): 
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If you sell 2 units of the good at a price equal to 30 per unit, your profit in this example becomes (30 - 
11) + (30 - 22) = 27. 
Exercise 1: What is your profit if you sell the first unit for a price equal to 51, the second unit for 42 
and the third unit for the price 35?  
Exercise 2: What is your profit if you sell the 4 units at the constant unit price 50?  
All the experimental markets (1, 2 and 3) consist of a series of trading periods. Note that your supply 
curve will shift between each of these trading periods.  
A.3. Trading rules (session 040400a) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 sales of the good occur if a buyer chooses to accept an offer of yours to sell. 
You formulate such an offer (an ask) by specifying both price per unit and the number of units 
offered (quantity). A sale occurs if a buyer accepts (parts of) your ask. 
x In market 2 you may still sell when a buyer accepts your ask. However, in addition the buyers can 
themselves formulate bids to buy in which they specify price per unit as well as the number of 
wanted units (quantity). Now a sale can take place if you choose to accept (parts of) such a bid. 
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.3. Trading rules (session 040400b) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 you can sell units of the good in two ways. First, sales of the good occur if a 
buyer chooses to accept an offer of yours to sell. You formulate such an offer (an ask) by 
specifying both price per unit and the number of units offered (quantity). A sale occurs if a buyer 
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accepts (parts of) your ask. Second, in addition the buyers can themselves formulate bids to buy in 
which they specify price per unit as well as the number of wanted units (quantity). Now a sale can 
take place if you choose to accept (parts of) such a bid. 
x In market 2 you are only permitted to sell when a buyer accepts (parts of) your ask.  
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.3. Trading rules (session 040400c) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 sales of the good occur if you choose to accept a bid to buy from a buyer. 
Such a bid specifies both price per unit and the number of wanted units (quantity). A sale occurs if 
you accept (parts of) a buyer's bid. 
x In market 2 you may still sell by accepting a bid. However, in addition you can formulate offers 
to sell (asks) in which you specify price per unit as well as the number of offered units (quantity). 
Now a sale can take place if a buyer chooses to accept (parts of) your ask. 
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.3. Trading rules (session 050400d) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 you can sell units of the good in two ways. First, sales of the good occur if a 
buyer chooses to accept an offer of yours to sell. You formulate such an offer (an ask) by 
specifying both price per unit and the number of units offered (quantity). A sale occurs if a buyer 
accepts (parts of) your ask. Second, in addition the buyers can themselves formulate bids to buy in 
which they specify price per unit as well as the number of wanted units (quantity). Now a sale can 
take place if you choose to accept (parts of) such a bid. 
x In market 2 you are only permitted to sell by accepting (parts of) a bid from a buyer.  
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
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A.3. Trading rules (session 050400e) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 sales of the good occur if you choose to accept a bid to buy from a buyer. 
Such a bid specifies both price per unit and the number of wanted units (quantity). A sale occurs if 
you accept (parts of) a buyer's bid. 
x In market 2 you can formulate offers to sell (asks) in which you specify price per unit as well as 
the number of offered units (quantity). Now a sale can take place if a buyer chooses to accept 
(parts of) your ask. 
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.3. Trading rules (session 050400f) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 sales of the good occur if a buyer chooses to accept an offer of yours to sell. 
You formulate such an offer (an ask) by specifying both price per unit and the number of units 
offered (quantity). A sale occurs if a buyer accepts (parts of) your ask. 
x In market 2 the buyers can themselves formulate bids to buy in which they specify price per unit 
as well as the number of wanted units (quantity). Now a sale can take place if you choose to 
accept (parts of) such a bid. 
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.4. Profit and payment 
All transactions in the 3 experimental markets will be nominated in experimental dollars. Your profit 
in experimental dollars is automatically calculated by your computer and updated after each trading 
period. At the conclusion of the experiment the aggregated profit is converted to Norwegian kroner 
and paid to you in cash by the experimenter. 
In your case the conversion factor between experimental dollars and Norwegian kroner equals 0.1. I.e., 
100 experimental dollars equals 10 Norwegian kroner. 
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Specific instructions for buyers:
A.2. Your trading role 
In this experiment you are going to be a buyer of a fictitious good on a computerized market.  
Apart from you there are 3 buyers and 1 seller on this market. 
Your demand curve for this good is shown numerically on your computer screen. 
Example 
A discrete demand curve for 4 units of the good may look like this (but will assume different values 
during the experiment): 
    
If you buy 2 units of the good for a price equal to 20 per unit, your profit in this example becomes (55 
- 20) + (44 - 20) = 59. 
Exercise 1: What is your profit if you buy the first unit for a price equal to 30, the second unit for 14 
and the third unit for the price 13?  
Exercise 2: What is your profit if you buy the 4 units at the constant unit price 10?  
All the experimental markets (1, 2 and 3) consist of a series of trading periods. Note that your demand 
curve will shift between each of these trading periods.  
A.3. Trading rules (session 040400a) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 the seller can formulate an offer to sell (an ask). Every offer to sell specifies 
both price per unit and the number of offered units (quantity). A purchase of the good occurs if 
you choose to accept (parts of) the seller's offer.  
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x In market 2 you may still buy units of the good by accepting the seller's ask. However, in addition 
you are now allowed to formulate bids to buy in which you have to specify price per unit as well 
as the number of wanted units (quantity). Then a purchase can take place if the seller chooses to 
accept (parts of) such a bid. 
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.3. Trading rules (session 040400b) 
The rules that govern sales of the good are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 you can buy units of the good in two ways. First, the seller can formulate an 
offer to sell (an ask). Every offer to sell specifies both price per unit and the number of offered 
units (quantity). A purchase of the good occurs if you choose to accept (parts of) the seller's offer. 
Second, you are allowed to formulate bids to buy in which you have to specify price per unit as 
well as the number of wanted units (quantity). Then a purchase can take place if the seller chooses 
to accept (parts of) such a bid. 
x In market 2 you are only permitted to buy units of the good by accepting (parts of) the seller's 
ask.  
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.3. Trading rules (session 040400c) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 you can formulate bids to buy. Every bid specifies both price per unit and the 
number of wanted units (quantity). A purchase of the good occurs if the seller chooses to accept 
(parts of) your bid.  
x In market 2 you may still buy units of the good if the seller accepts (parts of) your bid. However, 
in addition the seller is now allowed to formulate offers to sell (asks). An ask specifies price per 
unit as well as the number of offered units (quantity). Then a purchase can take place if you 
choose to accept (parts of) such an ask. 
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
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A.3. Trading rules (session 050400d) 
The rules that govern sales of the good are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 you can buy units of the good in two ways. First, the seller can formulate an 
offer to sell (an ask). Every offer to sell specifies both price per unit and the number of offered 
units (quantity). A purchase of the good occurs if you choose to accept (parts of) the seller's offer. 
Second, you are allowed to formulate bids to buy in which you have to specify price per unit as 
well as the number of wanted units (quantity). Then a purchase can take place if the seller chooses 
to accept (parts of) such a bid. 
x In market 2 you can only purchase units of the good if the seller chooses to accept (parts of) your 
bid.
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.3. Trading rules (session 050400e) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 you can formulate bids to buy. Every bid specifies both price per unit and the 
number of wanted units (quantity). A purchase of the good occurs if the seller chooses to accept 
(parts of) your bid.  
x In market 2 the seller is allowed to formulate offers to sell (asks). An ask specifies price per unit 
as well as the number of offered units (quantity). Then a purchase can take place if you choose to 
accept (parts of) such an ask. 
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.3. Trading rules (session 050400f) 
The rules that govern trading are going to vary between the 3 experimental markets:
x In markets 1 and 3 the seller can formulate an offer to sell (an ask). Every offer to sell specifies 
both price per unit and the number of offered units (quantity). A purchase of the good occurs if 
you choose to accept (parts of) the seller's offer.  
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x In market 2 you may formulate bids to buy in which you have to specify price per unit as well as 
the number of wanted units (quantity). Then a purchase can take place if the seller chooses to 
accept (parts of) such a bid. 
You will practice both sets of trading rules in the 2 test runs prior to the experiment. 
A.4. Profit and payment 
All transactions in the 3 experimental markets will be nominated in experimental dollars. Your profit 
in experimental dollars is automatically calculated by your computer and updated after each trading 
period. At the conclusion of the experiment the aggregated profit is converted to Norwegian kroner 
and paid to you in cash by the experimenter. 
In your case the conversion factor between experimental dollars and Norwegian kroner equals 0.3. I.e., 
100 experimental dollars equals 30 Norwegian kroner. 
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Appendix B: Laboratory data 
Endogenous variables Exogenous variables 
MD V E TG Session DS2 DS3 DB DD DO XShift
-2.29 13 98.72 32.145 040400a 0 0 0 0 1 0 
-8.29 12 100 18.91 040400a 0 0 0 0 1 6 
-1.86 12 97.44 37.17 040400a 0 0 0 0 1 18 
-2.42 13 97.44 37.665 040400a 0 0 0 0 1 -9 
-2.86 13 95.51 30.87 040400a 0 0 0 0 1 21 
-8.06 12 100 15.545 040400a 1 0 0 1 0 -3 
-0.92 12 100 45.995 040400a 1 0 0 1 0 -15 
-4.21 12 100 34.135 040400a 1 0 0 1 0 -9 
-4.75 13 98.72 32.47 040400a 1 0 0 1 0 21 
-2.17 13 98.08 32.025 040400a 1 0 0 1 0 9 
1.5 12 100 55.29 040400a 0 1 0 0 1 3 
2.31 13 98.72 57.305 040400a 0 1 0 0 1 -15 
-3.72 13 98.72 29.06 040400a 0 1 0 0 1 18 
-1.6 12 100 42.95 040400a 0 1 0 0 1 -33 
-2.94 13 98.72 35.225 040400a 0 1 0 0 1 9 
7.45 12 100 78.205 040400b 0 0 0 1 0 0 
3.91 12 100 66.985 040400b 0 0 0 1 0 6 
1.13 13 98.72 44.805 040400b 0 0 0 1 0 18 
8 12 100 80.45 040400b 0 0 0 1 0 -9 
4.5 11 98.72 65.26 040400b 0 0 0 1 0 21 
0.14 12 100 45.515 040400b 1 0 0 0 1 -3 
5.5 11 98.72 70.455 040400b 1 0 0 0 1 -15 
6.38 11 98.72 73.375 040400b 1 0 0 0 1 -9 
4.33 12 100 63.46 040400b 1 0 0 0 1 21 
2 11 98.72 55.52 040400b 1 0 0 0 1 9 
2 11 96.79 57.615 040400b 0 1 0 1 0 3 
8 11 98.72 75 040400b 0 1 0 1 0 -15 
1.89 11 98.72 54.545 040400b 0 1 0 1 0 18 
4.78 11 98.08 66.995 040400b 0 1 0 1 0 -33 
2.5 11 98.08 59.805 040400b 0 1 0 1 0 9 
0.83 12 100 53.205 040400c 0 0 1 0 0 0 
-5.17 12 100 30.13 040400c 0 0 1 0 0 6 
-5.92 12 100 27.245 040400c 0 0 1 0 0 18 
-1.24 12 100 45.225 040400c 0 0 1 0 0 -9 
-0.42 12 100 48.395 040400c 0 0 1 0 0 21 
0.07 11 98.72 50.26 040400c 1 0 0 1 0 -3 
6.64 11 98.72 73.7 040400c 1 0 0 1 0 -15 
7.01 11 98.08 75.525 040400c 1 0 0 1 0 -9 
2.91 12 100 60.93 040400c 1 0 0 1 0 21 
5.01 12 100 69.265 040400c 1 0 0 1 0 9 
2.5 12 100 59.615 040400c 0 1 1 0 0 3 
7.7 12 100 79.615 040400c 0 1 1 0 0 -15 
1.17 11 97.44 54.735 040400c 0 1 1 0 0 18 
7.55 11 98.72 76.98 040400c 0 1 1 0 0 -33 
6.31 12 100 74.265 040400c 0 1 1 0 0 9 
4.11 11 98.72 66.885 050400d 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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7 11 96.79 74.835 050400d 0 0 0 1 0 6 
2.8 12 100 59.615 050400d 0 0 0 1 0 18 
5 12 100 72.435 050400d 0 0 0 1 0 -9 
0.67 12 96.15 47 050400d 0 0 0 1 0 21 
-1.75 11 94.87 46.285 050400d 1 0 1 0 0 -3 
2.3 12 100 60.895 050400d 1 0 1 0 0 -15 
-3.5 11 98.72 36.69 050400d 1 0 1 0 0 -9 
-0.67 11 98.72 48.05 050400d 1 0 1 0 0 21 
0.6 11 98.72 50.975 050400d 1 0 1 0 0 9 
3.57 11 98.72 63.96 050400d 0 1 0 1 0 3 
-0.5 11 98.72 49.675 050400d 0 1 0 1 0 -15 
0.5 11 98.72 48.375 050400d 0 1 0 1 0 18 
5.75 11 98.72 67.855 050400d 0 1 0 1 0 -33 
0.5 12 97.44 51.645 050400d 0 1 0 1 0 9 
0.82 12 100 53.205 050400e 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.2 12 100 48.395 050400e 0 0 1 0 0 6 
1.56 11 98.72 55.845 050400e 0 0 1 0 0 18 
4.08 12 100 65.705 050400e 0 0 1 0 0 -9 
-2.09 11 97.44 43.09 050400e 0 0 1 0 0 21 
0.38 8 85.26 52.255 050400e 1 0 0 0 1 -3 
-0.17 12 100 49.36 050400e 1 0 0 0 1 -15 
-3.45 12 100 38.46 050400e 1 0 0 0 1 -9 
3.92 12 100 65.065 050400e 1 0 0 0 1 21 
1.08 12 100 54.165 050400e 1 0 0 0 1 9 
2.09 11 98.08 57.845 050400e 0 1 1 0 0 3 
2.55 11 98.72 59.09 050400e 0 1 1 0 0 -15 
-0.92 12 100 46.475 050400e 0 1 1 0 0 18 
0.25 12 100 50.96 050400e 0 1 1 0 0 -33 
2.45 11 98.72 58.765 050400e 0 1 1 0 0 9 
5.17 12 100 68.87 050400f 0 0 0 0 1 0 
9.7 11 98.08 83.66 050400f 0 0 0 0 1 6 
8.25 12 100 81.73 050400f 0 0 0 0 1 18 
5.17 12 100 69.87 050400f 0 0 0 0 1 -9 
4.08 12 100 65.705 050400f 0 0 0 0 1 21 
5.6 11 98.72 70.13 050400f 1 0 1 0 0 -3 
6 11 97.44 73.355 050400f 1 0 1 0 0 -15 
10.33 10 96.15 83.335 050400f 1 0 1 0 0 -9 
5.89 11 98.72 72.08 050400f 1 0 1 0 0 21 
4.3 12 100 66.665 050400f 1 0 1 0 0 9 
3.75 12 100 64.425 050400f 0 1 0 0 1 3 
5.58 12 100 71.475 050400f 0 1 0 0 1 -15 
3.75 12 100 64.425 050400f 0 1 0 0 1 18 
5.08 12 100 69.55 050400f 0 1 0 0 1 -33 
3.58 12 100 63.78 050400f 0 1 0 0 1 9 
